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These days, it seems that wherever computers are, pri-
vacy and security problems arise. From identity theft to
feelings of invasion by spam email to evidence in crim-
inal cases from surveillance cameras, privacy and secu-
rity are hot topics, even in the popular press.
There are many aspects of the ‘‘privacy problem’’ and
the ‘‘security problem.’’ When Chris recently opened a
bank account for his daughter, he witnessed many of
them in an environment that was far from ‘‘ubiquitous
computing.’’ First, she refused to give the bank clerk her
social security number (a financial ‘‘national identity
number’’ in the US) because she had learned that one
must safeguard this information to protect against
identity theft. The clerk, revealing as much information
as many ‘‘input error’’ Web pages, simply said, ‘‘I can’t
open an account for you without a social security
number.’’ Chris patiently explained to his daughter that,
legally, the bank was required to report certain infor-
mation to the government. These data were indexed via
the social security number.
Then, the clerk wanted to know the mother’s maiden
name (a standard question in the US for banks). Chris’
daughter got upset, since her mother’s ‘‘maiden name’’
was her surname; she had never changed it on getting
married. (Even if she had, she may have changed it back
upon divorce; privacy expectations change with social
customs.) This time the clerk was able to provide some
explanation: this was supposed to be personal informa-
tion that could be used to verify her own identity in
future transactions with the bank; in other words, it was
a password to protect her account. But, as Chris’
daughter pointed out, it would be easy for someone,
especially with Web access, to discover her mother’s
current last name. The clerk suggested that any other bit
of personal information could be used instead of the
maiden name. It then became clear that the bank forms
(infrastructure) did not have any way of recording
the appropriate challenge which would remind her of the
appropriate response in the future (the ‘‘password
problem’’). The whole interaction left several people very
suspicious of the bank, its security, and their privacy.
Now, in this scenario, the computation was hardly
ubiquitous! What happens in the brave new world
envisioned by those of us who publish in this journal?
Ubiquitous computing implies that computing is every-
where, and perhaps, so much a part of our digital
environment that we cease to notice it. Since (digital)
privacy seems to ‘‘happen’’ at the intersection of com-
puters and people, and privacy is already a major con-
cern even in the early stages of ubiquitous computing,
we seem to have a major headache brewing in the near
future. Also, the security issues that are already too
familiar will increase as computers become invisible and
ubiquitous. The sooner the research community ad-
dresses these serious concerns, the more likely we are to
solve the problems, or more likely, come up with com-
promise solutions acceptable to most users.
If ubiquitous computing is to be user-centered, the
research community must tackle the human–computer
interface (HCI) issues inherent in both privacy and
security. For users, security and privacy are deeply
intertwined. While at times they are very distinct (and it
is helpful analytically to separate them), users do not
always distinguish between them in considering their
data or in envisioning pervasive environments. Several
of the papers in this issue reinforce that premise. In any
case, it is clear that user-centered pervasive environ-
ments will require new ways of looking at privacy and
security.
In this issue of Personal and Ubiquitous Computing,
we present a selection of papers dealing with various
aspects of privacy and security. Clearly, it is a rather
expansive domain covering many different aspects of
ubiquitous computing, and this is reflected in the
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breadth of our contributions. All of the papers here,
nonetheless, present the complexity of the tradeoffs
inherent in privacy and security within pervasive envi-
ronments. Allowing users to determine or understand
these tradeoffs will be difficult. Requiring them to do so
may make adoption improbable. These papers begin the
arduous HCI effort of understanding how to tackle this
complexity so as to provide users with something they
can comprehend and control.
Dourish, Grinter, de la Flor, and Joseph examine
security as experienced by users in contrast to much of
the security literature. The authors note that users often
consider security to be the dual of privacy—security is
there to protect their data and prevent misdeeds. The
paper goes on to examine how the experience of security
in everyday activity differs from the mechanisms them-
selves. The paper is a fascinating read in how users
‘‘construct’’ technology and social mechanisms in order
to provide themselves with the assistance they need. The
authors also point out how users construct rationaliza-
tions to explain breakdowns.
Blythe, Wright, and Monk provide an insightful
examination into the privacy issues with regard to sur-
veillance. Their ethnographically based study examines
the elderly in a British community. The paper points out
the importance of considering demographics—particu-
larly age—in considering privacy and its ties to physical
security. For example, some seniors do not want assis-
tive technology within obvious sight of a window, since
it marks their houses as inviting targets. The paper goes
on from this ethnographic base to consider potential
surveillance devices and their demographic and societal
effects. The paper concludes with an interesting note
about the role that the changing percentage of elderly in
the population might have on societal considerations
about privacy and physical security.
Roussos and Moussouri consider a possible ubiqui-
tous application; that of grocery shopping in an intelli-
gent environment. Based on their user study, they bring
out the important privacy and trust dimensions that will
prevent or retard adoption. They found that many of
their consumers, for example, do not want one of the
standard ubiquitous computing scenarios; kitchens that
signal grocery stores as to their needs. In fact, some
prospective consumers saw such an application as a
flagrant privacy violation, although others were willing
to examine the potential benefits from the data transfer.
Roussos and Moussouri stress the importance of align-
ing the interests in data capture as well as maintaining
users’ control over data transfer.
Ackerman explores issues related to a technical
mechanism for ensuring privacy in the exchange of
personal information over the Internet, which he terms
‘‘labeling protocols,’’ an example of which is the MIT/
W3C Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P).
These protocols allow an interchange as to what may or
may not be done with particular pieces of private data.
He argues that some such protocol is essential, but that
bringing the full protocol and components out to the
user will probably not be a viable solution for pervasive
computing. This is similar to the findings of Lederer,
Hong, Dey, and Landay in their evaluation of their
original system. Ackerman considers the lessons from
the P3P experience, particularly with regard to pervasive
environments.
If end users are to have control over and confidence
in privacy protection mechanisms of software presenting
personal information to others, this must be expressed in
the user interface. This raises the serious question of the
level of granularity at which users wish to control what
is revealed about them, and how those choices are ex-
pressed. Lederer, Hong, Dey, and Landay address these
issues as a set of design guidelines that are motivated
in part from the failure of their earlier system. It is
refreshing for researchers to admit their mistakes, and
we can learn from their five guidelines, which provide
simple yet general coverage over a wide range of privacy
issues, together with supporting examples.
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